




Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia

**“ANALYSIS OF THE SIX PARTY TALKS
AND THE KOREAN CRISIS”**

Karya Ilmiah

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Karya ini adalah karya pribadi

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AND THE KOREAN CRISIS

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Birmingham UK, September 30, 2005
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Synopsis

In Chapter One: Theoretical Framework

The Korean nuclear crisis describes a situation that needs analysis, prediction and hypothesis. The writer will endeavour to explain how the theory of Neo-liberal institutionalism and Neo-realism see states as actors operating within its limitation as well as states' interaction and cooperation in the Six-Party Talks and to examine how the Six-Party Talks serve as an institution to resolve the Korean nuclear issue and how the six nation-states behave with regard to their national and regional security. The both theories will function as a guide to make data analysis, hypothesis determining, and literature comparisons as well as to present a theoretical foundation for the reader to comprehend examples of cooperation, actions and reactions between states in the Six-Party Talks.

In Chapter Two: Bilateralism Versus Multilateralism

The writer will analyse a variety of diplomatic ways attempted through bilateral and multilateral approaches in dealing with the 'Korean Peninsula crisis' in the Six-Party Talks, the level trust between the six parties in implementing any agreement as well as external and internal factors affecting the resolution of the Korean crisis.

In Chapter Three: The Effectiveness of The Six-Party Talks

The writer will address how the six parties are attempting to look for breakthroughs. The will then writer identify the roadmap toward resolution of the Korea crisis and look at the future crisis-settlement scenarios if the next Six-Party Talks does not result in tangible resolution, and the multilateral mechanism is subsequently abandoned.

Academic Year 2004/2005

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INTRODUCTION

North Korea's weapons programme has attracted great media attention in Asia Pacific. The Korean nuclear crisis began when South Korea built a nuclear weapons infrastructure in the 1970s (Joseph, 1996: 5). The competition with South Korea in the pursuit of nuclear weapons may have stimulated Pyongyang's interest in nuclear weapons as well as the civil war and the possible attack by its surrounding neighbours (Oh and Hassig 2004: 275).

The North's nuclear development programme was detected in April 1982 by an American supervision satellite discovering a visible nuclear-reactor ship at Yongbyon (Oberdorfer 1997: 250). The programme is considered as a direct menace to Asia Pacific region as well as to the international community through the North Korea's ballistic missile programme and the latent proliferation of knowledge and components (Robertson, 2003: 3). However, this programme is eventually used by North Korea as an entry for bargaining chip to get economic aid, especially after the country has been facing economic difficulties (Cunha, 2000: 126).

With its 'nuclear card', North Korea signed several bilateral accords for instance the US-North Korea Agreed Framework (October 1994), the Berlin Agreement in September 1999 and the October 2000 US-DPRK Communiqué committing both countries to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements (Tow, 2001: 97).

In addition, multilateral diplomatic efforts have been conducted through Four-Party (U.S.-DPRK-ROK-China in six meetings from 1997 to 1999), Three-Party (U.S.-DPRK-China in 2003), and, most recently, Six-Party Talks – the US, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 162).

There have been four Six-Party Talks; the first round (August 27-29, 2003), the second round (February 25-28, 2004), the third round (June 23-26, 2004), and the fourth round (July 26 - August 7, 2005). Despite the efforts, North Korean nuclear issues remain the main security concern in Northeast Asia since there is no simple

way out for this crisis and that this problem should be seen as a case that is requiring long process and long-term management (People's Daily, 2003).

The Korean crisis becomes more complex because it is connected to other external and domestic issues such as recovery of DPRK's economy, bilateral issues (abduction and establishing diplomatic relations), and the change of the ceasefire regime to a peace regime, the enlargement of ballistic missiles and its transfer to the third countries, as well as the use of conventional weapons. This requires a comprehensive policy package that deals with the issues above mentioned and a roadmap (Yamamoto and Bedeski, 2003).

To solve the crisis, compromise breakthroughs were proposed by China in the fourth Six-Party Talks aiming at bringing North Korea and the United States in agreement on document of principles. North Korea finally agreed to surrender its nuclear arms, halt its nuclear programmes, rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation, and allow the IAEA inspectors for surveillances as long as it may retain the rights for peaceful nuclear programmes. While President Bush vigilantly welcomed the agreement but expected irreversible elimination of all nuclear programmes (Kessler and Cody, 2005: 01).

Despite the agreement, there is great distrust between the US and the DPRK on the issue of who will take the first action or initiative in the denuclearization (Xinhua, 2005a). Apart from that, the fourth Six-Party Talks were welcomed by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. Annan said, "He was hopeful that this process, however challenging and complicated it may be, will lead to solutions to mutual and bilateral concerns, reducing tensions, and strengthening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region". (Butler, 2003).

CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Korean nuclear crisis describes a situation that needs analysis, prediction and hypothesis. Over the years, various forms of talks have been attempted to solve the nuclear issue: Two-Party (U.S.-DPRK in 1993–94), Four-Party (U.S.-DPRK-ROK-China in six meetings from 1997 to 1999), Three-Party (U.S.-DPRK-China in 2003), and, most recently, Six-Party Talks (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 162).

The Six-Party Talks have become a basis to resolve the Korean nuclear issue. Even though no concrete resolution – other than agreement to meet again – has been achieved, the Six-Party Talks represent significant pace in dealing with the worsening security situation in Northeast Asia. The important things are that all parties are willing to keep dialoguing and realising a nuclear-free Korean peninsula (Yamamoto and Bedeski, 2003).

This chapter will see how the Six-Party Talks act as an institution to resolve the Korean nuclear crisis and how the six nation-states behave with regard to their national and regional security. Therefore, in this research the writer uses the neo-liberal institutionalism approach and neo-realism approach as the theoretical foundations. The theories will be used to analyse and predict the behaviour of nation-states and the effectiveness of Six-Party Talks.

The writer also endeavours to explain how the theories see states as actors operating within its limitation (O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, 2004: 163) as well as states' interaction and cooperation in the Six-Party Talks. The both theories will be used to make data analysis, to determine hypothesis, to compare literature and to present a theoretical foundation with instances of actions, behaviour, and cooperation between states in the Six-Party Talks.

The writer also endeavours to explain how the theories see states as actors operating within its limitation (O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, 2004: 163) as well as states' interaction and cooperation in the Six-Party Talks. The both theories will be used to make data analysis, to determine hypothesis, to compare literature and to

present a theoretical foundation with instances of actions, behaviour, and cooperation between states in institutions. The writer will also examine the effectiveness of rules and enforcement mechanisms in the institutions regarding the resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis.

1.1. What is Neo-Liberal Institutionalism?

In this theory, states are deemed as self-interested actors that pursuit absolute gains and cooperation (Hobson, 2000: 95). Because states have self-interests for absolute gains, they will cooperate repeatedly even in an anarchic international system (Papp, 1988: 8).

The emergence of interstate cooperation can be well understood by referring to the parallel policies and aims between the state members through a process of policy coordination in the institution (Keohane 1984: 51-52). In the context of the six party talks, the writer tries to define institutions in loose way with which the theory of the neo-liberal institutionalism applies to arrangements which are not necessarily embodied in formal but also informal institutions (Keohane in Grittersova, 2000: 42).

The cooperation should be seen as an unlimited, distributed, and repeated process which is able to influence actors and their actions in international system (O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, 2004: 151), because interdependence between states in the cooperation can generate reliability and certainty, and produce set of laws, systems and institutions that organise the relationships of states (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 4-19).

Through the cooperation and iterated processes, states usually endeavour to arrange and adjust their policies to work out a reciprocal problem or reach shared gains beyond preliminary accords in long-term governance orders and latent social change. To attain the goals, understandings in relationships between involved actors and their nature are needed (O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, 2004: 150).

The importance of cooperation through institutions is that states can obtain information about states' purposes from institutions. Hence, any worst-case scenario

of states can be anticipated or prevented, and predictability and stability can be increased (Buszynski, 2002: 485).

Basically anarchy is present between states but not unsolvable. States can lessen or abolish anarchy if they apply the effective means of institutions and seek long-term absolute gains because institutions represent or reflect member states' interests (Papp, 1988: 8).

Nonetheless, this is not to say that cooperation is not without conflict, but successful attempts in easing or eliminating conflict, real or potential are to some extent determined by cooperation through the means of institutional bargaining process (Grittersova, 2000: 45-46).

The interactions of states are seen by neo-liberals as a "positive-sum game" from which absolute gains can be achieved by the actors (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987: 207). To seek long-term absolute gains, states need to do long-term cooperative interactions (Baylis and Smith, 2001: 191).

In the view of neo-liberal institutionalism, institutions are formal and informal organisations in which actors operate under rules and practices set in the broader political order (Peter and Rosemary, 1996: 936-937). Thus, institutions can bring regulative impact on the members because their particular behavioural patterns are restricted (Hoffman, 2004: 7).

In addition, institutions are organised patterns of accepted practices of interaction, taken for granted assumptions, and mutual expectations (Chang, 2002: 5). They provide enforcement mechanisms, and other devices that allow states to realize joint gains (Keohane, 1998: 379).

Institutions are considered successful when they can alter or shape the states' behaviour and other actors according to the agreements of cooperating parties (O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, 2004: 164).

However, the success of altering or shaping the states' behaviour should not only be measured or assessed on how the interests and identities of states are treated in institutions, but also on how far understandings between states can maintain international, emancipatory, and inclusive regimes (Grittersova, 2000: 6).

In the view of neo-liberalists, institutions are the mediator and the means to maintain the long-term cooperative interactions (Lamy in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 191), because institutions offer communication means and generate a network of interdependence that is emerging from institutional commitment (Jervis 1999, 42–63).

Through institutions, states hand over some level of their authority to negotiate or narrow differences. As a consequence, this can lead to a constraint on anarchy, or asymmetrical sharing of information (Hobson, 2000: 99). Through institutions, cooperation can be strengthened and directed (Hoffman, 2004: 7), joint problems can be resolved, transaction costs and insecurity can be minimised (Ikenberry 2001: 15).

In international system, institutions are logically considered important by states because they provide trustworthy information and transparency as well as substance efficacy to lessen or even abolish the possibility of cheating in the international system. (Hoffman, 2004: 7).

States will emphasise their loyalty to their allies for any long-term advantage instead of instant gains, as it is not impossible that the other ally will take revenge on the other day if betrayal happens (Axelrod in Baldwin, 1993: 91). States will maintain their interaction for an unknown period of time except their relationship is halted by a pre-emptive war (Baldwin, 1993: 92). If conflict cannot be prevented by actors involved, then the institutions may have poor structural and institutional arrangements (Papp, 1988: 8).

Institutional arrangements will be sustainable and long-lasting in facilitating and coordinating states' interests as long as the expectations of distributed reciprocity are continuously shown by the parties (Grittersova, 2000: 45).

Even though states will definitely have limited choices in the institutions, they can maximise efficiency in pursuit of their self-interests by facilitating and coordinating

effective cooperation (Keohane, 1984: 80-83), since institutions pose facilitators of power distribution which can provide efficiency mechanisms (Rodan, Robison and Hewison 2001: 7-8).

Theoretically, well-designed institutions have wide-ranging guidelines for solving collective problems and for enforcing productive and effective agreements such as information distribution, ruling the number of parties, expectations stabilised by rules, information signals, enforcement mechanisms, obedience information, and reliable punishments (Cerami 2005: 17).

As regards this outlook, institutions can subsequently produce or form power in term of individual or shared interests, social assets and efficiency. Thus, the institutional medium and individual institutions can, in turn, be shaped by the power it self (Carroll, 2005: 18).

To see the effectiveness and the high chance of success of institutions, it can be assessed through four dimensions which include the processes of enforcement and supervision, inducement structures, considerations of long-term gains, and facilitating good deals such as setting up principles, procedures, rules, patterns (Cerami, 2005: 29-32).

In addition, the influence and effectiveness of institutional regime on the cooperating members can be seen by evaluating the regime strength regarding on how far the regime rules are obeyed by its members and to what extent particular goals are accomplished in the cooperation, especially in negotiating the issue-area (Grittersova, 2000: 43).

Regarding the application of this theory in resolving the Korean nuclear crisis, it is necessary for the parties concerned to institutionalise the Six-Party Talks, to establish liaison groups for contact continuation and to set up the realistic arrangements in the longer period. Any form of agreement or consensus achieved at the meeting would then be institutionalised in the form of treaty which is later authorised by the legislative organisation before commencing (Jingrong and Da, 2004).

1.2. International System in the Theory of Neo-Realism

In contrast to neo-liberal institutionalism as discussed earlier, neo-realists argue that anarchy, conflict and hostility exist in the international system. States do not trust each other and that; they need to pursue gains and security for their own national interests (Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 336).

As a consequence, states are seen as the main actors in international system in which measurement of their strategic circumstances and external surroundings become an important foundation in considering and deciding preferences (D'Aoust, 2004: 7).

In this anarchic international order, states see the importance of power to protect themselves from the domination of other states as Thucydides said; "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept" (Thucydides, 1978: 402).

When the system is dominated by the great powers, anarchy becomes the major concerns in shaping the behaviour of states. This view in turn encourages states to pay more attention on their own security or survival and relative gains vis-à-vis other states in the international system (O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, 2004: 152-153).

To secure their national interests, collective and balanced potentials must be used by states in terms of armed forces, economics and other potentials depending on their ranking and scoring on certain points such as political stability and capabilities, military strength, economic competence, resource donation, as well as size of population and territory (Waltz 1979:131).

In international politics, neo-liberal institutionalist Robert Keohane explains that states are rational actors, "To say states act rationally . . . means that they have consistent, ordered preferences and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality". (Keohane, 1986: 11).

On the contrary, Neo-realists argue that even though states are rational, miscalculation is likely to occur occasionally due to inadequate information in the anarchic system. Anarchy in the international order vastly restricts the preferences of states and that security becomes the most vital preference of any state. (Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 337).

Furthermore, this theory sees that every state is in a self-help system, and exists in an anarchic international system (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987:48-49). As states must serve themselves, defence strategy becomes essential to guard their sovereignty, leading to perform balance of power with other states (Buszynski, 2000: 484).

In this anarchic situation, powers put states in a different way. Divergences of power are more affecting the behaviour of states than those in internal ideologies or in governmental structure. Internal political pressures or ideological preferences are outweighed by the pressures of competition (Keohane 1986:329).

The competition between states will continuously occur even when they are pressured to receive provisions of interdependence by evading their offensive actions and changing behaviour. The pressures of competition include the pursuit of political influence, the contest of marketplace, the promotion of one's group, and the need for status or prestige (Buszynski, 2002: 485).

In the system of competition, balance of power will remain preserved and the anarchic system will be maintained (Waltz, 1979: 124). As a result, every state is always striving to measure their weaknesses and strength each other and to follow any advance or capabilities occurring in other state. States will always imitate each other in terms of any progress that enables them to show attributes to other state. Failing this can lead to backward and susceptibility. (Waltz, 1979:128).

Such a competitive system will, in turn, make states suspicious with one another. Ultimately security and sovereignty become the only assurance states can depend on. This would restrict states in cooperation because they become self-

interested and one of factors which limit the cooperation is the search of a state's main interest, namely survival (Baldwin, 1993: 127).

Under anarchy, states must sustain and guarantee their own rules, stability and security, because there is no greater power that can protect them except the states themselves. Thus states have no much alternative with regard to the determination of their foreign policy actions, motivation, interest and behaviour (Spanier, 1978: 18).

1.3. The Prospects for State Cooperation

In general, neo-realists are doubtful with the prospects for cooperation among states (Acharya, 1999: 3). According to neo-realism, there are two core reasons which hinder cooperation; first is calculations of relative-gains, and second is fears of cheating (Grieco, 1990, 28).

One of the structural hindrances to cooperation is the anarchic system. States cannot cooperate effectively and establish rules when they are in basic tension and continuous threat of being overthrown by other state and thus cooperation and rules are useless. Cooperation and rules in their opinion are like enemy and alliance in the anarchic system (Waltz, 1986: 762).

Therefore, states will be reluctant to make alliance and to rely totally on other state for security due to their fears of cheating. Neo-realists assume that today is ally but tomorrow could be enemy, or today is enemy but tomorrow could be ally. This makes actors hard to calculate the balance of power in cooperation (Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 338).

One example is that when the cooperation is dominated by a hegemonic state or that is called as hegemonic cooperation (Hobson, 2000: 39). Hegemonic states can be meant as an actor or state that has adequate power to control the relationship of state with the rules established (Grittersova, 2000: 12).

A hegemonic state with the preponderance of power generally provides other states with inducements both negative and positive (Ikenberry, 2000: 11). The regular use of inducements and threats by the preponderant state eventually creates

hegemonic order which makes other states depend on substance competences such as benefits of technology, economy, capital, markets, and military power (Keohane, 1984:39).

The hegemonic power is ultimately undermined by the costs of granting the incentives in alliance and as a consequence this can decrease or abolish capability and continuance of the cooperation (Lamy in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 187).

Thus, even though institutions represent some cooperating states, they do not shape those states because institutions are merely the means of sharing of power in the international order and they do not possess an autonomous value and quality (Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 340).

In the anarchic international system, states would prefer to pursue control and independence rather than cooperation and interdependence. Cooperation will exist only if the anarchy of the international system conditions it (Waltz, 1979: 116).

In the context of the Korean crisis, North Korea perceives that the destabilisation of domestic order could occur if it opens and enhances its contacts (interdependence and cooperation) with external states. Thus domestic stability and order have become the main concern including the role of military (NIDS, 2001: 124-125).

Moreover, the emergence of the current North Korean nuclear crisis is understandably triggered by the North's past nuclear goal, economic troubles, and the intention to guarantee its survival (Robertson, 2003: 4).

Internal and external pressures could also lead North Korea to develop nuclear weapons programme (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 55). When states are intimidated or segregated by a larger enemy or a neighbour, they will pursue nuclear weapons which can in some way provide them with national security (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 46).

Thus, the acceleration of North Korea's nuclear weapons development might have been caused by its continuing insecurity. The North's nuclear ambitions could be

abandoned if it were given inducement and guarantee although there is a doubt about cooperating with North Korea. The main concern North Korea considers is cheating. North Korea might be worried that cheating on the agreement will be done by the other party once it has joined into cooperative contracts (Sigal, 1999: 248-249).

However, it does not mean that cooperation is unlikely to happen between states and to reach an agreement. The most precise description in the view of neo-realism is that a restricted structure of cooperation is more secure than a full or dependent one (Grieco in Baldwin, 1993: 118).

Therefore, despite the security concern, Pyongyang also expects that nuclear issue can be an entry point or chance to attract the United States to negotiate the issue more deeply such as armistice-peace agreement agenda and that enables North Korea to protect its economic profits (Kim, 1998: 62-63).

Viewing the North's ambiguous position in abandoning its nuclear weapons, the writer suggests that North Korea, on the one hand, views security as the main concern for its regime survival; on the other hand, Pyongyang's worsening economic problems demand the government to accept the cooperation for diplomatic bargaining chip in exchange for dismantling nuclear programme, because the North Korea's ability to keep the regime survive highly depends on the running economy (Robertson, 2003: 4). In other words, North Korea's security concern is based on both fear and opportunism (Kim, 1998: 167).

To sum up, even though there are basic difference approaches between the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism, both theories provide beneficial description of institutions and the characteristics (behaviour) of their members as well as the impacts within the wider perspective of cooperation concepts (Cerami, 2005: 10).

CHAPTER TWO: BILATERALISM V.S. MULTILATERALISM

Various diplomatic attempts dealing with the Korean nuclear crisis have not resulted in a concrete resolution yet. This situation, to a certain degree, has worsened the security and increased the tension in the Korean peninsula in the last three years (Jung, 2004).

In response to the situation, a multilateral mechanism (Six-Party Talks) was set up in 2003 by six states – the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. In the forum, diplomatic solution and dialogue process to a peaceful denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula become the main goals of the members (BASIC, 2005: 2).

In spite of the current results of the fourth Six-Party Talks, the vast difference between the main actors remains on who will act first in implementing the document of principles (Xinhua, 2005a).

In this chapter, the writer will look at fundamental concerns on the level of trust between main actors in implementing agreements as well as external and domestic issues which affect the process of the Six-Party Talks in recent times.

2.1. The Level of Trust between Parties

In the view of America, North Korea's nuclear weapons programme must be discarded first before Washington provides it with any economic assistance and diplomatic relations. Subsequently, this must be followed by the North's acceptance of international inspection regime to watch all related nuclear programmes (Butler 2003).

In contrast, North Korea insisted that it should receive inducements and concessions before it freezes nuclear development and eventually dismantles its nuclear programme. The inducements and concessions include diplomatic

recognition, energy and economic assistance as well as security assurances. In fact, the US is still worried about Pyongyang's pledge and refuses to reward the DPRK's nuclear misconduct (Global Insight, 2005).

Pyongyang will leave nuclear weapons only when Washington's hostile policies towards the North have been removed, mutual trust is built, relations with the country's government have been normalised, and after any nuclear menace from the Korean Peninsula has been taken away (CNN.COM, 2005a).

As reported in early 1957 that nuclear arms were stationed by America in South Korea and frequent military exercises were carried out with nuclear-capable artillery and aircraft on the Korean peninsula. South Korea, on the one hand, may see this as an insurance against attack; on the other hand, North Korea views it as a threat (Sigal, 1998: 20-21).

With regard to the threat, the Washington's demand on abandoning nuclear weapons programme first is then considered by North Korea as a trick (Butler, 2003). Pyongyang remains fearful that any deal could still create a security menace to the country (China Daily, 2005). Therefore, the North's nuclear programme would be surrendered if a non-aggression treaty is signed by the US and North Korea as a security assurance (Butler, 2003).

North Korea needs American security assurances to abandon its nuclear-arming. These assurances could include the withdrawal of all American nuclear warheads from the Korean peninsula and suspension of the large military exercises conducted annually with South Korea (Sigal, 1998: 25).

To strengthen the guarantee, Russia sees the importance of expansion of security assurances to Pyongyang. This can be implemented on bilateral and multilateral basis (Xinhua, 2005c). In the context of Six-Party Talks, multilateral format supports the idea that Korean crisis is a regional or international problem, instead of a bilateral US-DPRK issue (Brookes, 2003).

Multilateralism became the view of the Bush administration since it could not attain its objectives unilaterally or bilaterally. However, expanding any alliance is not without a risk, especially in managing members who are probably not sympathetic to U.S. foreign policy or even who are opposing it (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 163).

In the view of China, bilateral approaches, to some extent, become an effective way in dealing with not only security issues but also inter-state relations in general (Yuan, 2000: 10). Bilateral problems need a settlement within the bilateral framework of the countries concerned. If bilateral problems are settled within a multilateral framework, this may cause the problems more complex to resolve (Guo, 1994: 53-54).

Similarly, it is difficult to see how the members of the Six-Party Talks reach any compromise because of various approaches and means of dealing with security problems unless serious concessions are made by all parties (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 166). The Six-Party Talks seem to be meaningless to reach the eventual settlement of the bilateral DPRK-US nuclear problems (Xinhua, 2005d). The talks only build up Pyongyang leaders' confidence that nuclear deterrent force is needed as a self-defensive measure to protect their country in case of no other choice (Butler, 2003).

Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether it will be enough for Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons if the United States improves bilateral wide-ranging diplomatic relations with North Korea and provides North Korea with a full security assurance, because Pyongyang may have learned from external experiences that the US' diplomatic relations with Iraq and Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1998 did not obstruct warfare in the subsequent years. Thus, Pyongyang may conclude that US treaties are meaningless (Sano, 2004).

Despite the weaknesses, multilateral approach involves adaptive mechanism that is able to promote the goals of the actors above and beyond their fundamental conditions and responsibilities (O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, 2004: 150-151). It is understandable because security assurance under multilateral mechanism is stronger than that under bilateral mechanism. Under multilateral security guarantee, the US does not only commit to North Korea but also to other parties. If the

commitment is violated by the US, North Korea has a strong reason to ask China and Russia to provide security help (Chul, 2003: 19).

Despite its reluctance, North Korea has eventually accepted the multilateral approach through the Six-Party Talks (BASIC, 2005: 2). Japan and Russia take part because they want to be active in the decision-making process, and the presence of South Korea in the Six-Party Talks is to prevent the United States from triggering a war (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 166-168).

Great dispute and distrust between the US and North Korea remain intense over the right of Pyongyang to retain peaceful nuclear activities. Washington's objection to this programme is based on the North's past experience by changing a research reactor into weapons use with Soviet help in the North's main nuclear complex at Yongbyon (CNN.COM, 2005b).

The top U.S. envoy, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said, "We cannot have a situation where North Korea pretends to abandon their nuclear program and we pretend to believe them. We need to have a situation where we know precisely what they have agreed to do, exactly what they have agreed to abandon." (CNN.COM, 2005a).

The main challenge of the Six-Party Talks rests on attempts to persuade North Korea to give transparency that is necessary for verification of obedience with any accords (Brookes, 2003). Transparency is a vital part of the six-party talks, and important as basic principles (Kelly, 2004). While the US should adopt "modest initiative", North Korea has to reduce its anti-American rhetoric and allow its nuclear programmes under IAEA safeguards (Anderson, 1990: 19).

Nevertheless, one of the main factors for the DPRK (North Korea) to not stop or give up their nuclear programmes is not merely economic. Economic aid is of course important to them but they see security as the biggest issue. They are frightened of the likely US' attempts to remove the regime from power (Oberdorfer, 2005), because North Korea has been the target of more American nuclear threats at least since 1945 (Barry, 1978: 2).

Therefore, North Korea has understood the importance of possessing nuclear weapons as the form of the country's defence specifically against Washington and that negotiations may be used to buy time for developing stockpile of nuclear weapons. North Korea always declares its objectives of denuclearising the Korea peninsula but at the same time, maintain a nuclear deterrent to secure itself from U.S. attacks (Sano, 2004).

North Korea also seems to be reluctant to negotiate for only the same reason. Pyongyang may realise that they have a well-built bargaining power and have the right time to cut a deal (Kotaji, 2005). Pyongyang sees that the worth of its nuclear weapons programmes is greater than ever; the greater the issue, the more it is worth (Kim, 1998: 148).

With regard to the major North Korean security concerns, the United States is deemed by China as the main problem in the Six-Party Talks, referring to America's policy toward the DPRK. The US should make clear its position and affirm its commitment to think about North Korea's security concerns (Butler, 2003). The Six-Party Talks can reach significant progress only if the U.S. is willing to relax its posture and beginning to discard the view about North Korea as a grave threat to world peace (Oh, 2005).

In response to this, Washington also criticised on China's unwillingness to use its political and economic influence to force Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, while Beijing contends that it can not do that in order to avoid North Korea refugees into China (Park, 2005: 88).

Besides, critics and pressure against the Bush administration's policy also came from Former President Carter who opposed the US administration's approaches such as rejecting direct talks, labelling North Korea as an axis of evil, invading Iraq and capturing North Korean ships at sea. These approaches are deemed as the greatest threat in the world to regional and global peace (Butler, 2003).

Despite the critics, whatever option of action that is undertaken by the United States and the rest of the international community against North Korea, it is not

impossible that Pyongyang is eventually aimed at maintaining the regime in power with the power of its nuclear weapons programme, instead of providing the North Korean with security assurance, nor improving the welfare of the North Korean people (Oh, 2004).

If this is the case, any incentives that have been given to North Korea cannot be valued in accordance with whether they are beneficial for the North Korean economy or people, but whether they help keep Kim Jong-il in power (Oh and Hassig, 2004: 279).

This can be seen as, in fact, the regime stays in power in spite of the continuing economic trouble and food scarcity. North Korea appears to be very proud of its military power and of the well-known slogans that are symbolising “the building of a powerful nation” and “the army-centred policy” or “army-first policy” (NIDS, 2002: 154).

Apart from that, if any agreement can be reached in negotiation, the agreement should include a peace accord and assurances from the United States that there will be no attacks, discrimination and critics against North Korea. Besides, the US should also respect North Korea’s political system and the country’s socialist economy (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 162).

In short, there are two main goals in resolving the Korean nuclear crisis; the first is dismantlement of the North’s nuclear programme and the second is security assurance to North Korea. Formal assurance can be accepted provided that North Korea allows enough verification and elimination of nuclear weapons, instead of just promises on paper (Yamamoto and Bedeski, 2003).

The principles of the resolution should flow from bilateral to regional/multilateral arrangements; from confidence-building measures (CBMs) to security arrangements / regional disarmament; from informal/nonofficial to formal/governmental discussions (Yuan, 2000: 12).



2.2. Factors Affecting the Resolution of the Korean Crisis

The long-awaited fourth round of six-way talks over North Korea's nuclear-weapons programme ended without tangible resolution (CNN.COM, 2005a). There are some factors behind this; first, the nuclear programme has been going for a long time and sinking high cost. Secondly, the nuclear weapons become a pride of North Korean people which enable them to oppose the United States. Thirdly, in the eyes of his military and his people, Kim Jong-il's nuclear deterrent gives legitimacy on the "respected and beloved general." (Hassig and Oh, 2003:161).

In addition, the nuclear weapons programme can also be used for a bargaining chip with the United States, South Korea and Japan. The nuclear arsenal can be traded away through diplomatic and economic concessions. Furthermore, North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons may also be intended to secure the country and to extend the regime of Kim Jong-II (Sano, 2004).

On the other hand, the Bush administration has tended to prolong the Korean nuclear crisis and has never given a concrete solution. This may give the US a legitimacy to maintain its protection in the instable region. Given such conditions, any agreement would probably be pretty meaningless, even though new round of talks could produce results (Kotaji, 2005).

There are four correlated factors that differentiate the recent nuclear crisis from its historical counterparts. Firstly, United States hard-line foreign policy on regime-change strategy, in particular after the September 11 terrorist attacks, has rigorously restricted the options available to negotiators in search of settlement of the crisis (NIDS, 2002: 21).

Secondly, the tension between Seoul and Washington has worsened their relations in line with the increase of anti-Americanism in South Korea, including the amendment of the Status of Forces Agreement for the positioning of US Forces in South Korea (Robertson, 2003: 9).

Thirdly, America's invasion of Iraq has left limited options and resources available to cope with North Korea. These factors have raised the difficulty of searching for an urgent satisfactory resolution to the crisis (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 158).

Lastly, differences of vision between US and South Korean policy on relations with North Korea have been shown through South Korea's willingness to reunion with the North (Robertson, 2003: 9).

2.3. External Issues

The September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States had a tremendous influence on the internal and external environments in East Asia (NIDS, 2002: 19). Washington's moves appear to reflect the Bush administration's strategy based on the hard-line Bush doctrine of neo-conservative fundamentalism (Takahashi 2005: 3).

This is likely intended to enhance the global war on terrorism and to prevent the suspected nuclear states from trading nuclear weapons and their components to terrorists which pose a danger of nuclear weapons being exploded in US cities (Robertson, 2003: 4).

There is also a possibility that No Dong and related technology has been transferred by North Korea to Iran and Pakistan. The aim was not only to strengthen its military capability but at the same time as a means to earn hard currencies and as a diplomatic bargaining chip (NIDS, 2001: 144). North Korea was portrayed as an outlaw state whose misdeeds warranted economic sanctions (Sigal, 1999: 207).

Considering the suspicions, through the Six-Party Talks first set up in August 2003, the September 11 terrorist attacks were used by the Bush administration as an opportunity and momentum of its war on terrorism and to set diplomatic pressure on North Korea which has been considered as a terrorist-supporting state and a builder of nuclear weapons (NIDS, 2002: 143).

But the United States' objective for the particular war-on-terrorism campaign was not going well. The members of the Six-Party Talks are more concerned about

maintaining peace and security in the region rather than backing North Korea into a corner or putting pressure on North Korea to leave its nuclear weapons programme and return to the NPT (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 165).

Despite the unwelcoming responses, Pyongyang laid its opposition to all kinds of terrorism and all activities to support it. Still, the United States was in doubt as to whether Pyongyang's words would be the same as their concrete actions. In response to that, North Korea persisted that the September 11 terrorist attacks would not be a source of a brutal circle of terrorism and revenge that may sink the world into the war (NIDS, 2002: 35).

The fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan - including the Iraqi regime - was resulted by the American attacks because the regime was accused of concealing the mastermind of terrorists in the world (NIDS, 2002: 19).

North Korea realises that the United States is using its greater power of military to confront it as conducted in the Gulf War and the Afghanistan war. As a result of the two wars, the nuclear deterrent is needed to its defence because the regime survival depends on the capability of the regime to protect itself (Robertson, 2003: 4).

2.4. The Effect of Iraq War

The war on Iraq has proven the efficacy of a US hard-line approach to non-compliance and of the great power of US led forces. International media and some politicians believe that the Korean nuclear crisis may become the second attention after Iraq (Robertson, 2003: 14).

The war on Iraq has led North Korea to be worried and vigilant against the US next target of "pre-emptive strike", because before the Iraq War, North Korea was deemed by the Americans to have a greater threat than Iraq to the United States. Besides, mutual allegations between the DPRK and the United States had been during the Iraq War (People's Daily, 2003a).

The American invasion of Iraq had demonstrated North Korea that the United States could end a nonaggression treaty without a mandate from the Security Council and that motivated North Korea to rely on its own nuclear weapons for national defence (Chul, 2003: 18).

It can be understood therefore that North Korea keeps on building up a nuclear weapons capability and being reluctant to reach any concrete agreement in the Six-Party Talks for the better part of its survival as a state since the regime could become a target of the US pre-emptive attack even though the DPRK has only a small nuclear deterrent (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 158).

In the current situation, it is almost unlikely that the only pride of nuclear weapons would be surrendered voluntarily by Kim Jong Il. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate national status symbol (Global Insight, 2005).

The Korea's nuclear weapons ability also becomes a guarantee that the US will not have any consideration or plans of invading and bringing about regime change in Pyongyang itself. The nuclear weapons give a warning to Washington will have to pay a very high price if the attack is conducted. The price could be described as the ruin of US bases in Japan and South Korea or even Los Angeles and San Francisco (Sano, 2004).

In the eyes of Pyongyang, the Iraq War demonstrated that war can be ended and national security can be defended if they have powerful physical containment capabilities (People's Daily, 2003b). It is reasonable that Kim Jong Il might have learned a vital lesson about the benefit of the bomb (Global Insight, 2005).

Furthermore, North Korea contends that in the future armed conflicts, the warfare will be performed at the same time in three-dimensional in nature such as on land, sea and in the air. Thus, weapons and long-range missiles capabilities become important to gain a triumph (NIDS, 2002: 163).

If North Korea does hold nuclear weapons, the United States' final anxiety is approaching to reality; on the other hand, if North Korea discards its nuclear weapons,

its own eventual alarms of US attacks are approaching to reality. As a consequence, neither side trusts each other, nor this makes the both side likely to hold sincere and productive negotiations in the Six-Party Talks (Butler, 2003).

Despite the Iraq war and its consequences on the Six-Party Talks, the Bush administration believes that the US invasion of Iraq has created a huge political pressure with regard to eliminate the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Libya's surrender, for example, has convinced the United States of the effectiveness of a hard-line policy (Yongming, 2004).

With the case of Libya, other states engaged in covert nuclear arms programme are requested by President Bush to take the positive example of Libya. Those governments will be given an easy way to better relations with the US and other legitimate nations if they are willing to abandon the search for WMD. On the contrary, the US will impose political isolation, economic sanction and other punishment if they keep pursuing on WMD (Kelly, 2004).

But some analysts believe that North Korea will not follow the Libya's steps by accepting inspections due to Pyongyang's far deeper distrust of the outside world (Magnier, 2004). Further, Pyongyang regards US hostility as the root cause of the nuclear issue (Yongming, 2004).

In the eyes of Pyongyang, there are great divergences between the case of Libya and North Korea. Libya did not lose much energy and materials by disarming it self under the international supervision, but North Korea has spent a lot of energy for its nuclear weapons programs and that it needs appropriate inducements (Park, 2005: 79).

Referring to Libya, the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave a statement saying, "the US should not expect Pyongyang to follow the example and give up its weapons. Even, the Workers' Party newspaper argued Iraq made a big mistake allowing the weapons inspections and not preparing for war." (Tobback, 2004).

In solving of North Korean nuclear crisis, China prefers to see Ukraine as model for resolution, where Russia and the United States successfully convinced Ukraine to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme inherited from the Soviet Union. While the United States always views Libya as the appropriate model for resolving the Korean problem (Park, 2005: 85).

2.5. Domestic Issue

Since the fall of Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Moscow's enduring help for Pyongyang, North Korea's economic problem has worsened humanitarian crisis so that the economy cannot be prolonged without outside help (NIDS, 2001: 21). The economic crisis has led to the black market economy, the refugee flows across the Chinese border, extensive electricity scarcity and insufficient infrastructure (Noland, 2001).

This situation has broadened Pyongyang's options to take the benefit of the South Korean offers of economic cooperation. Even though, this does not abolish the significance of China as a trading partner and political ally, the economic cooperation between the South and the North has definitely decreased the North's reliance on Beijing (SGI, 2005).

The country's only expectation to solve the crisis is fundamental reform, but the regime appears unwilling or unable to undertake it (Reese, 1998: 9). Despite the North's economic difficulty and food shortage and its isolation from international community, the regime is still in power (NIDS, 2002: 154).

Consequently, the domestic situation of North Korea has played an important role in bringing about the talks and acceptance of food aid from other countries (NIDS, 2001: 21). But security concern and the regime survival remains to be the priority. Domestically, on the one hand North Korea is trying to maintain and strengthen its military power under slogans such as "the building of a powerful nation" and army-centred politics" (NIDS, 2002: 137).

On the other hand the regime appears to have no options of solution. It is likely to collapse, but the process could be long-lasting and could harm regional stability (Reese, 1998: 9).

The Six-Party Talks may become the way out of the crisis in which every member plays its card for reciprocal interests. Japan, for example, has required the resolution of abduction cases involving Japanese nationals before any aid would be extended such as food or energy to the country (Magnier, 2004).

Meanwhile, China expects to keep away from being confronted with North Korea, its long-time ally, and the US, a central trading partner. With its influence on Pyongyang's attitudes and policies, China has played its active diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks to produce concrete agreements and to reduce the tensions. The role of China with itself at the centre of the Six-Party Talks is essential to cope with North Korea, although it eventually helps strengthen its own regional influence (Yamamoto and Bedeski, 2003).

With the assurances and concessions from the members, the Six-Party Talks can become a means of halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and cooperative threat reduction. This has a long record of achievement. For example, American guarantees and incentives have assisted convince South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan to abandon their WMD (Sigal, 1998: 4).

In spite of the results, the US position on proliferation is not without critics. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criticised; "the US should set an example to the world by stopping its nuclear arsenal and closing down research programmes. It is ironical that the while the US government orders other nations not to acquire nuclear weapons but it is arming itself. If the United States does not end applying double standards there will be more nuclear weapons." (Butler, 2003).

CHAPTER THREE: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS

3.1. Breakthroughs and Roadmap toward Resolution

As alleged by international communities, North Korea has been holding some nuclear weapons. These North's efforts pose the breach of four international accords, namely the Joint Declaration of Denuclearised Korean Peninsula, the NPT, the concord of IAEA monitoring and the 1994 Agreed Framework (Hwang, 2005: 1).

A variety of efforts have been undertaken by the United States to cope with the North's policy strategies such as a combination between a strategy of diplomatic give-and-take and security guarantee followed by reciprocity and inducements (Sigal, 1999: 4). However, there are still profound distrust and inflexibility between the United States and North Korea (Park, 2005: 76). This can not be separated from a historical context where the concerned parties have different aims and dissimilar long term interests in the Korean peninsula (Lilley, 2005: 1).

In addition, contradictory priorities, opposing historical similarities and domestic policy limitations also pose some factors which might have influenced the stance of each member in the Six-Party Talks (Park, 2005: 75). Given the fact, the history of why North Korea is ambitious to become a nuclear power must be understood by the other five members so that a general diplomatic approach can be formulated effectively (Kogan, 2005: 12).

Even though there is no easy solution, continuance of the Six-Party Talks is essential for the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of North Korea's nuclear development problem and that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons must instead be viewed as a situation that will continue to require good and long-term management (People's Daily, 2003).

Regarding the hard solution, informal bilateral approaches need to be enhanced continuously at the negotiating table, as they are an essential factor in accelerating the resolution of the Korean crisis. This informal approach has actually been attempted in the third Six-Party Talks, but unfortunately this opportunity was

used by both North Korea and the United States to deliver their threats, leading to counter-productive (Chul, 2003: 7).

In the fourth Six-Party Talks, China has played its significant role as a host of the negotiation to persuade both countries to discuss more systematically and to deal with the comprehensive scope of linked issues so that the talks can result in concrete settlement (Huntley, 2005: 4).

Theoretically, there are three steps to reach the settlement; firstly, high-level bilateral summits need to be accomplished so that any difference of policy goals can be coordinated and priorities between members can be established. Secondly, a broad road map needs to be drafted in an official accord. Thirdly, all parties must realize the main aims as formulated in the agreement (Park, 2005: 76).

One of the breakthroughs that is important to note in the last talks is the idea that economic assistance or incentives should be solved through multilateral talks, while the nuclear issue and the guarantee of the regime's survival are tackled through one-on-one meetings between the DPRK and the United States – this is a combination between bilateral and multilateral approaches (Yamamoto and Bedeski, 2003).

This breakthrough was so effective, as reported from Beijing on Monday, September 19, 2005, that a joint statement was ultimately achieved by the six envoys of the Six-Party Talks. With the agreement, North Korea promised that its nuclear weapons and related programmes would be dismantled (Cody, 2005b: 01). It also intends to resume to the NPT and allow the inspections of IAEA (Kogan, 2005: 11).

In return for this, North Korea was pledged by the United States that the regime would not be attacked nor occupied with the US' nuclear or conventional weapons, its sovereignty would be respected, its rights for civilian nuclear energy would be provided and its relations with the US will be normalised (Huntley, 2005: 2).

There are some features exhibited in the fourth Six-Party Talks; first, the process of the negotiations seemed to be ups and downs and was full of tension;

second, the atmosphere of the negotiations was ferocious, tense, thorough and practical; third, all members conducted bilateral or multilateral discussions very intensively; last, they altered their inflexible way of arranging the date for the conference and they did not fix a definite date for the meeting opening full time for diplomatic mediation (Dunqiu, 2005: 1).

Interestingly, in recent talks, an enthusiasm to negotiate creatively in resolving the Korean crisis has been shown by both North Korea and the United States since the 1994 Agreed Framework ended (Huntley, 2005: 5). The agreement in the fourth Six-Party Talks is basically the result of the combined achievements in the preceding three rounds of talks. The accomplishments include connotation of the talks, new contents, and extensive breakthroughs which provide real expression to the goal of the Six-Party Talks for realising denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (Dunqiu, 2005: 1).

Despite this current progress, the agreement is merely preliminary and requiring further concrete accords. Thus, the progress of the Six-Party Talks can be understood as a transition period after the Korean crisis has hang up for almost three years (Kessler and Cody, 2005: 01). In the text of the joint statement merely general terms were discussed (Cody, 2005b: 01), but this became an entry point to hold further diplomatic talks on the ultimate disarmament of North Korea's nuclear programme (Kessler and Cody, 2005: 01).

Moreover, in the article 4 of the text of the joint statement, there has been a change in the mechanism and nature of the Six-Party Talks. Not only settlements of the Korean nuclear issues were discussed in the forum but mechanisms of Korean peninsula and Northeast Asian security were addressed as well (Dunqiu, 2005: 1).

At least, the Six-Party Talks have realised certain objectives which could ensure North Korea that the US has willingness to maintain negotiation and constructive atmosphere for the following talks (Jack, 2005: 2). With regard to normalisation of relations, confidence building becomes essential to assure Kim Jong Il that his regime will not be changed or attacked (Kogan, 2005: 13-14).

In the process of achieving the joint statement, there was actually a great distrust of the United States regarding North Korea's controversial demand to preserve peaceful nuclear activities. The distrust of the US against Pyongyang lies on the past transformation of the North's nuclear research into weapons-grade plutonium, kicking out IAEA inspectors in late 2002 and withdrawal from the NPT (Cody, 2005c: 30).

The Washington's fear can be understood by reference to the analysis of many non-proliferation experts that states could abuse their rights of peaceful nuclear power generation that is provided by the NPT to turn it into nuclear weapons programmes (Huntley, 2005: 2).

The North's demand on the light-water reactor raised sharp differences among the members of the Six-Party Talks (Huntley, 2005: 5). To changing degrees, Russia, South Korea and China did not object to the North Korea's retaining its right for peaceful nuclear programme, while Japan refused it except for research for agricultural or industrial use and medical (Kessler, 2005: 21).

After a long negotiation, divergences over North Korea's demand to preserve peaceful nuclear activities could be narrowed through the basis of a compromise proposal. The compromise allowed North Korea to retain the right to peaceful nuclear energy, provided that after it has disarmed its nuclear weapons programme, permitted the UN nuclear inspection regime and rejoined the NPT (Cody, 2005b: 01).

As regards the North's rights for the peaceful nuclear energy, all parties approved to talk about this issue "at an appropriate time". This means that this issue will become the main concern in the following Six-Party Talks (Huntley, 2005: 2). President Bush vigilantly welcomed the accord as "a step forward in making this world a more secure place, but warned that a verifiable process is the ultimate goal." (Kessler and Cody, 2005: 01).

In the implementation of agreements, distrust between the US and North Korea resumes to be the major problem. The distrust has always centred on who will act first in the exchange of the nuclear weapons programmes for the nuclear reactor. In contrast to the US insistence, the North Korea would only dismantle its nuclear

deterrent after receiving the Light Water Reactor (LWR) from the US as a physical guarantee for confidence-building (KCNA, 2005).

North Korea desires that action should be implemented concurrently by the United States and North Korea, problems should be dealt with one by one, shared trust should be improved, and a base for co-existence should be built (Chul, 2003: 17). Nonetheless, it seems that North Korea did not show signs of accepting the offer especially an exchange for light-water reactors (Huntley, 2005: 5). This marks the North's conventional way of diplomacy based on threat and strategic withdrawal (Jack, 2005: 2).

North Korean confrontational actions can be understood by referring to its past behaviour (Huntley, 2005: 5). This has become a trademark of Pyongyang's policy in increasing the intensity of pressure and then acquiring higher bargaining position (Hwang, 2005: 1). It is not impossible that the outcome of the September Agreement would be the same as what occurred on the 1994 Agreed Framework, leading to the possible criticism on the Six-Party Talks but the North's strengthened nuclear programmes (Huntley, 2005: 6). The Agreed Framework did not succeed to realize the final purpose of dismantling North Korean nuclear weapons but only to freeze it, thus suspending rather than resolving the crisis (Robertson, 2003: 6). Nevertheless, it remains essential to have more rounds of negotiations to resolve the nuclear problem since the agreement does not deal with a series of issues which may be controversial like timing and strategies of implementation (CNN.COM, 2005c).

There are two aspects that can be observed by the international communities in the fifth round talks; first, whether all parties can attain documented accord on the objectives, principles and methods to settle the problem, and whether they can outline documents that can direct follow-up talks. Second, whether the parties can set up organisations specialised to work out technical problems during the negotiations. Once they reach these two points, the talks can be called a success (Yongming, 2004).

The road of peace to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue can be gained if all parties concerned have a willing to develop cooperation, to exchange views in

depth, to pursue common reasons, to narrow dissimilarities and to strive for consensus (Xinhuanet, 2005).

They also have to reinforce and maintain their commitment on the negotiation process in order that the principles of the agreement can be realised and the sharp disputes can be worked out (Huntley, 2005: 5). Yet, given the standoff and mistrust between North Korea and the United States, it may take a long time to apply the September accord (Jack, 2005: 3).

Probably, to ensure North Korea under these circumstances, any treaties related to the Six-Party Talks issues need to be endorsed by the United States Congress and that the US administration must comply with the treaties (Chul, 2003: 18). Any breakthrough should be attempted through the means of Six-Party Talks for the sake of realising a peacefully denuclearised Korean peninsula and of strengthening regional security cooperation (Huntley, 2005: 8).

In brief, there are two main aspects about the significance of the September Joint Statement; first, the agreement resulted through the Six-Party Talks provides a strong warning that any threats from potential proliferators would be confronted by international community. Second, the September Joint Statement gives a greater opportunity to Washington diplomats for further negotiation through the Six-Party Talks rather than the American officials who choose regime change in North Korea (Kogan, 2005: 11).

The joint statement is realistic, balanced and of a win-win solution (Xinhuanet, 2005). However, regular arrangements and maintenance of bilateral and multilateral dialogues need to be enhanced because the accord remains fragile, so that outbreak of great conflict and distrust between the U.S. and the DPRK can be prevented (Jung, 2004).

3.2. Future Crisis-Settlement Scenarios

If the next Six-Party Talks does not result in tangible resolution, and the multilateral mechanism is subsequently abandoned, there might be some scenarios regarding the settlement of the North's nuclear crisis;

First of all, the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons programme will probably be taken by the United States to the UN Security Council. Tighter sanction and embargoes will be imposed by the United States and the UN to Pyongyang's regime with regard to the North's breach of the NPT. However, this route will face obstacles from China who has apparently stated its plan to veto American action at the UN (Global Insight, 2005).

What China fears of the UN sanctions and embargoes is the collapse of the North Korean regime. This could lead to disorder on its borders and the potential of a surge of huge refugees who are striving to run away from the poor country (Parry, 2005).

Like China, South Korea also opposes sanctions and instead provides substantial economic assistance to North Korea. In the view of South Korea, sanctions and embargoes could create a grave negative impact on the North Korea people, instead of Kim Jong-Il's regime. On the one hand, North Korean people become more suffering; on the other hand, the Pyongyang's military-first becomes more powerful. It is doubtful that attempts to stop the main sources of Pyongyang's finance will be effective to end the regime, since it has various accesses to survive (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 167).

In addition, since Pyongyang implemented the *Juche* ideology of self reliance, there has been no a noted history of success with regard to the use of sanctions and embargoes. The result is instead chaos and severe humanitarian disaster in North Korea (Pritchard, 2005: 4).

The second scenario is military attack. This attempt would be extremely dangerous, risky and costly, because it could trigger a massive full-scale war with nuclear missile attacks which may cause sea of fire, turmoil and a massive surge of refugees. The North's neighbours could become the nuclear targets. It is difficult to destroy North Korea's plutonium and nuclear weapons with surgical strikes. In any case, North Korea may hold other weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological), conventional arms as well as special army that could bring a menace to

the United States and its allies in Asia Pacific (Oh and Hassig 2004:277-278). American allies robustly oppose military action in the region, because they fear if North Korea may take revenge by attacking Japan and South Korea with nuclear (BASIC, 2005: 3).

In addition, military strike is morally and legally questionable. International community will oppose it because of the great risks. Japan, it self as the US enduring ally, apparently resists the use of military force against North Korea. The faith of Pyongyang must be determined by the North Korean people, instead of outside powers (Butler, 2003).

The third scenario is to ignore the North Korean nuclear programme as long as North Korea does not play its nuclear threat to its neighbours and the rest of international community chooses to ignore it. This sort of action or rather inaction could strengthen DPRK's military forces and its threats to other countries, including the United States (Oh and Hassig 2004:277-278).

The fourth scenario is through Korean reunification. If the Korean reunification occurs, nuclear threats may become less to South Korea – perhaps not for Japan and the US. But at least, the reunification can reduce the tension in the Korean peninsula to some extent and the need of the US presence in the region may also be diminishing. With regard to the nuclear weapons programme, a reunified Korea will inherit it from North Korea, and will use it only as a deterrent, instead of bargaining chip. In such a scenario, the Korean nuclear crisis will resolve itself, not through force or multilateral dialogue (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 168).

Although the United States perceives that it is much simpler to achieve a nuclear-free Korean peninsula after reunification than the present situation, but a nuclear North Korea or a nuclear reunified Korea is seen intolerable by the US as potential threats of proliferation of WMD always become the US main concern (Pritchard, 2005: 9).

CONCLUSION

There have been a variety of attempts in dealing with the Korean nuclear issue; Two-Party (U.S.-DPRK in 1993–94), Four-Party (U.S.-DPRK-ROK-China in six meetings from 1997 to 1999), Three-Party (U.S.-DPRK-China in 2003), and, most recently, Six-Party Talks (Hassig and Oh, 2003: 162).

A multilateral mechanism (Six-Party Talks) was set up in 2003 by six states – the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. In the forum, diplomatic solution and dialogue process to a peaceful denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula become the main goals of the members (BASIC, 2005: 2).

The importance of cooperation through institutions (Six-Party Talks) is that states can obtain information about states' purposes from institutions. Hence, any worst-case scenario of states can be anticipated or prevented, and predictability and stability can be increased (Buszynski, 2002: 485).

Nonetheless, this is not to say that cooperation is not without conflict, but successful attempts in easing or eliminating conflict, real or potential are to some extent determined by cooperation through the means of institutional bargaining process (Grittersova, 2000: 45-46).

The Six-Party Talks may become the way out of the crisis in which every member plays its card for reciprocal interests (Magnier, 2004). Breakthroughs in the Six-Party Talks are an essential factor in attaining a denuclearised Korean peninsula and in strengthening regional security cooperation (Huntley, 2005: 8).

The principles of the resolution should flow from bilateral to regional/multilateral arrangements; from confidence-building measures (CBMs) to security arrangements / regional disarmament; from informal/nonofficial to formal/governmental discussions (Yuan, 2000: 12).

However, recently, only little progress was reported from the last round of Six-Party Talks (Jack, 2005: 1). Despite the Joint Statement achieved in the fourth Six-Party Talks (Kogan, 2005: 11), there are still profound distrust and inflexibility between the main actors in the Six-Party Talks - United States and North Korea (Park, 2005: 76). This can not be separated from a historical context where the concerned parties have different aims and dissimilar long term interests in the Korean peninsula (Lilley, 2005: 1).

What North Korea needs in recent times are American security assurances. These assurances could include the withdrawal of all American nuclear warheads from the Korean peninsula – if available - and suspension of the large military exercises conducted annually with South Korea (Sigal, 1998: 25).

It remains uncertain whether it will be enough for Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons when the United States has improved bilateral wide-ranging diplomatic relations with North Korea and provided North Korea with a full security assurance, because Pyongyang may have learned from external experiences that the US' diplomatic relations with Iraq and Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1998 did not obstruct warfare in the subsequent years. Thus, Pyongyang may conclude that US treaties are meaningless (Sano, 2004).

Even though there is no easy solution, continuance of the Six-Party Talks is essential for the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of North Korea's nuclear development problem and that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons must instead be viewed as a situation that will continue to require good and long-term management (People's Daily, 2003).

It remains essential to have more rounds of negotiations to resolve the nuclear problem since the agreement does not deal with a series of issues which may be controversial like timing and strategies of implementation (CNN.COM, 2005c). The road of peace to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue can be gained if all parties concerned have a willing to develop cooperation, to exchange views in depth, to pursue common reasons, to narrow dissimilarities and to strive for consensus (Xinhuanet, 2005).

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APPENDIX

Text of Joint Statement From Nuclear Talks

Issued on Monday, September 19, 2005; 1:22 AM

Text of the joint statement issued Monday by six nations at talks in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear program:

For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia at large, the six parties held in a spirit of mutual respect and equality serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks and agreed in this context to the following:

1) The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards.

The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

The ROK (South Korea) reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 joint declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory.

The 1992 joint declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactor to the DPRK.

2) The six parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations.

The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.

The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the (2002) Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

3) The six parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.

China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12, 2005, concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

4) Committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

The six parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in northeast Asia.

5) The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action."

6) The six parties agreed to hold the fifth round of the six party talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

